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The Penn Central' decision, in its most immediate concern, pro-
vided a legal framework within which local governments could en-
force historic landmark restrictions without a regular constitutional
requirement to pay "just compensation." The decision amalgamated
regulatory takings analysis of historic landmark restrictions to the
familiar and tolerant federal standards for reviewing zoning. Affirm-
ing the importance of the public interest goals of historic preserva-
tion, the Court directed inquiry to whether sufficient economic po-
tential remained in the control of the property owner, given
reasonable expectations at the time of her investment in the property.
While the broader jurisprudential merits of Penn Central's approach
to the Taking Clause have been the subject of wide debate, the con-
stitutional question of how much of an economic burden the owner
of a landmark may be required to bear has received very little atten-
tion. Ironically, it is this question that very well may have been the
Court's primary concern.
This essay looks specifically at how Penn Central protects historic
preservation regulation. The constitutional framework created by
the decision has fostered a remarkable blossoming of historic preser-
vation as a major tool of urban land use regulation. Preservation
could never have played this role without the insulation from consti-
tutional liability provided by the Penn Central Court, likewise, it
could not have played this role if property owners had been denied
Professor, Georgetown University Law Center; Faculty Direc-
tor; Georgetown Environmental Law and Policy Institute.
1. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104
(1978).
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all economic incentives to invest in the renovation and reuse of his-
toric properties. Penn Central appears to have crafted a balance be-
tween local control and individual rights that has nourished preserva-
tion.
I. THE PENN CENTRAL DECISION AND ITS WAKE
For this brief essay, only the shortest summary of the decision is
necessary. New York City designated Grand Central Station a his-
toric landmark in 1965, pursuant to its Landmarks Preservation Law.
The City's Landmarks Preservation Commission subsequently de-
nied as inappropriate the application of the owner, Penn Central, to
build a tower more than 50 stories tall above the station. Penn Cen-
tral sued, claiming that the Commission had "taken" their property in
violation of the Takings Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, by
denying such development as was otherwise permitted by New
York's zoning laws. Eventually, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
there was no taking. The Court noted that regulatory takings cases
involved "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries," but also identified
several factors that have "particular significance." Such factors are:
1) the economic impact of the regulation on the owner; 2) the extent
to which the regulation "has interfered with distinct investment
backed expectations"; and 3) the "character of the governmental ac-
tion."2 The Court found that the denial of the permit did not restrict
the owner's property rights by precluding economically beneficial
use of the property, did not single out the owner to bear an unfair
burden, and promoted the public interest. In reaching this decision,
the Court viewed Grand Central Station as an entire property, which
included the Transferable Development Rights (TDR's) created by
the landmark designation.
Penn Central was understood at all times to be a crucial constitu-
tional test for historic landmark protection laws and for historic pres-
ervation as land regulation more generally. The speakers at this con-
ference have captured much of the excitement and apprehension that
the case generated.3 Penn Central constituted a great victory for
2. Id. at 124.
3. Not only the preservation activists were energized by the case.
Some years ago, I dined with Daniel Gribbon and the late Charles
Horsky, who had represented Penn Central, and asked them what
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historic preservation. Moreover, it provided courts a basic approach
to regulatory takings claims throughout the rise and fall of the con-
stitutional property rights movement that became such a prominent
feature of the 1980's and 1990's. After considering various doc-
trinal alternatives based on per se rules, the Supreme Court again
endorsed Penn Central as the dominant precedent in regulatory tak-
ings law in the important Tahoe Sierra decision.4 While this high
constitutional drama has been playing out in courts and scholarly
writing, largely in cases involving environmental protections, his-
toric preservation law has come of age in many cities, providing a
strong and pervasive regulatory system for knitting together existing
buildings and new development.5
Penn Central not only set the federal constitutional standard
for takings challenges to historic preservation, but the states have
also uniformly followed it in interpretation of their own constitu-
tions. In 1993, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, reversing its
initial decision, held that designating the Boyd Theater in Philadel-
phia as a historic landmark did not amount to a regulatory taking,
citing the consensus since Penn Central. The court wrote,
[I]n fifteen years since Penn Central, no other state
has rejected the notion that no taking occurs when a
state designates a building as historic. The decade
and a half in which the Penn Central decision has en-
strategic considerations had led them to choose a regulatory takings
suit rather than some other legal maneuver to get value from the ter-
minal site. Each replied with warm conviction that Penn Central had
sued because the landmark restrictions were unfair and unconstitu-
tional. It is useful to recall that Penn Central had been in bankruptcy
reorganization for many years, a heroic endeavor that gave birth to
Amtrak.
4. Tahoe Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,
535 U.S. 302 (2002).
5. For example, when Penn Central was decided in 1978,
Georgetown was the only historic district in Washington D.C. pro-
tected by regulations; today there are more than 30, along with other
designated landmarks, extending protection to nearly 30% of the
structures within the District. 438 U.S. at 104.
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joyed widespread acceptance weighs against our re-
jecting the Penn Central analysis.6
Rare, indeed, have been decisions since Penn Central where a court
has found any aspect of historic preservation law to constitute a tak-
ing. Few cases are brought, and very few are successful. My re-
search found only two reported decisions since Penn Central (both
from Maryland) in which a court found the imposition of a historic
preservation restriction to amount to an unconstitutional taking.
This is striking, giving how hotly contested Penn Central itself was,
and the substantial doubt, prior to Penn Central, whether landmark
preservation without purchase would be upheld.
Penn Central has served to effectively insulate historic preserva-
tion from regulatory takings challenges for three principal reasons.
First, Penn Central eliminated a variety of the concerns about coer-
cive historic preservation regulations. Second, it directed attention
to the value remaining in the property, and structures protected by
preservation restrictions (as opposed to natural resources protected
by environmental controls) nearly always have some economic value
that a clever developer can exploit. Third, preservation ordinances
have been drafted and administered in the light of Penn Central with
sufficient flexibility to avoid constitutional confrontations. In gen-
eral, the market has once again adapted to new land use restrictions.
II. ESSENTIAL LEGITIMACY OF LANDMARK PRESERVATION
REGULATION
Prior to Penn Central, courts had for some time accepted the idea
that state and local historic preservation represented a legitimate ex-
ercise of the police power, but the issue was still being litigated. 9
6. United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. Philadelphia, 635 A.2d
612, 619 (Pa. 1993).
7. Keeler v. Mayor of Cumberland, 940 F. Supp. 879 (D.Md.
1996); Broadview Apartments Co. v. Comm'n for Historical & Ar-
chitectural Pres., 433 A.2d 1214 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981).
8. It is sobering to recall that as recently as 1966, the New York
Court of Appeals had held that a six-month moratorium on the
demolition of the Metropolitan Opera House, to permit purchase of
the building by a newly created non-profit, was not within the police
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Penn Central settled conclusively that historic preservation advances
are an important public interest and thus fall within the police power:
Because this Court has recognized, in a number of set-
tings, that States and cities may enact land use restrictions
or controls to enhance the quality of life by preserving the
character and desirable aesthetic features of a city, appel-
lants do not contest that New York City's objective of
preserving structures and areas with special historic, ar-
chitectural, or cultural significance is an entirely permis-
sible governmental goal. They also do not dispute that
the restrictions imposed on its parcel are appropriate
means of securing the purposes of the New York City
law. 10
As a related matter, the Court's embrace of an essentially ad hoc,
factual approach ended lingering discussion of whether historic pres-
power. Old Metro. Opera House Corp. v. City of New York, 224
N.E.2d 700 (1966). Two years later, however, another New York
court found it "no longer arguable" that the city had the power "to
place restrictions on the use to be made by an owner of his property
for the cultural and aesthetic benefit of the community." Sailor's
Snug Harbor v. Platt, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314, 315 (1968). By then the
authority for the proposition was fairly strong. See, e.g., Rebman v.
City of Springfield, 250 N.E.2d 282 (1969); In re Opinion of the
Justices, 128 N.E.2d 357 (1955). Congress had enacted the National
Historic Preservation Act in 1966, which had declared it to be na-
tional policy that "the historical and cultural foundations of the Na-
tion should be preserved." 16 U.S.C. 470 (2000). The Supreme
Court had found that historic preservation was a "public use" within
the meaning of the Takings Clause in United States v. Gettysburg
Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896). Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26,
33 (1954), equated the scope of "public use" as a requirement for
eminent domain with the scope of the police power, while finding
that the latter authorized legislative authority "to determine that the
community should be beautiful as well as healthy."
9. Courts still found it necessary to declare that historic preserva-
tion was a legitimate purpose of regulation in A-S-P Assoc. v. City
of Raleigh, 258 S.E.2d 444 (N.C. 1979), and Maher v. City of New
Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 905
(1976).
10. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 129.
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ervation restrictions effected a categorical taking because they se-
cured a public benefit rather than prevented a public harm. The
harm/benefit distinction had previously been seen as an analytical
tool that could help distinguish where the government was acting
under its eminent domain power, rather than police power, and there-
fore owed the property owner compensation. Under this distinction
the government was exercising police power, requiring no compen-
sation to a property owner, when it was protecting the public health,
safety or welfare from harmful conduct, where a regulation sought to
secure a public benefit, however, this was an exercise of eminent
domain, requiring compensation." Historic preservation had been
thought difficult, or at least awkward, to classify as prevention of
palpable harm to the public. Penn Central, reflecting contemporary
jurisprudential thinking, dismissed the harm/benefit distinction as
unimportant. 12 Having found that historic preservation was em-
braced by the police power, the Court proceeded to examine the ef-
fect of the ordinance on the property owner, 13 and developed the rule
that historic regulators need pay compensation only when the eco-
nomic effect on the owner was severe.
Removing a final conceptual hurdle, the Court found that landmark
designations should not be subjected to more skeptical takings
analysis on the claim that they single out individual properties to
11. See, e.g., Alison Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for
City Planning, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 651 (1958).
12. Citing the classic article by Joseph Sax, Takings and The Po-
lice Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964), the Court stated that the prece-
dents "are better understood as resting not on any supposed 'nox-
ious' quality of the prohibited uses but rather on the ground that the
restrictions were reasonably related to the implementation of a pol-
icy - not unlike historic preservation - expected to produce a wide-
spread public benefit and applicable to all similarly situated prop-
erty." 438 U.S. at 134. See also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1022-23 (1992).
13. Ironically, Penn Central's inquiry into the "nature of the gov-
ernment's action," which seems in context only to consider the intru-
siveness of the legal instrument chosen by government to achieve its
purpose, such as prohibition of demolition rather than physical occu-
pation, has come in later lower court cases to invite a weighing of
the importance of the governmental interest. This invites some
pragmatic reconstruction of the harm/benefit distinction.
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bear unique burdens without any offsetting benefits. This had been
thought to be the strongest argument for the landmark owner because
it distinguished historic landmark restrictions from zoning or historic
district regulations, where each property was simultaneously bur-
dened and benefited by the same regulation. By contrast, the land-
mark owner is burdened by more onerous restrictions than his
neighbors, and receives an uncertain benefit from other landmarks in
the city. 14 The Court, however, dismissed this concern, finding that
New York's landmark program was a comprehensive plan to pre-
serve structures of historic or aesthetic interest wherever they might
be found in the city. 15 While the Court's point does answer concerns
about singling out the landmark owner capriciously or invidiously, it
fails to address the argument that the owner must bear an economic
loss different in kind from other regulated land owners, as Justice
Rehnquist tellingly emphasized in his dissent.' 6 The real answer to
the landmark owner is that the Takings Clause protects him only
from the narrow class of losses discerned through the Court's ad hoc
inquiries.
Penn Central thus barred categorical or qualitative arguments that
historic preservation regulations, including those of landmarks, were
takings. Rather, it affirmed preservation regulation to be an impor-
tant governmental function. Future regulatory takings claims against
historic regulation must focus on the specific economic conse-
14. See John Costonis, SPACE ADRIFT; LANDMARK PRESERVATION
AND THE MARKETPLACE 18-19 (1974).
15. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 132.
16. Rehnquist viewed historic districts as distributing costs and
benefits much like zoning: each property in the district is both bur-
dened and specially benefited. Id. at 147. By contrast, for a land-
mark, the cost is "uniquely felt and is not offset by any benefits
flowing from the preservation of some 400 other 'landmarks' in New
York City." Id. An irony of Rehnquist's dissent is that it put chal-
lenges to historic districts entirely beyond the pale of constitutional
argument. Id. Land marking is interestingly referred to as a "non-
zoning use of the police power" in the note, The Police Power, Emi-
nent Domain, and the Preservation of Historic Property, 63 COLuM.
L. REV. 708, 722 (1963). The paradigmatic example of an exercise
of the police power outside zoning is nuisance regulation, in which
the burden on the owner is justified by the harm the nuisance unjusti-
fiably imposes on others.
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quences of specific decisions about an owner's proposed changes in
the historic fabric.
III. Focus ON REMAINING ECONOMIC POTENTIAL
Penn Central focused analytically on whether the owner of a his-
toric landmark can still put the property to some reasonable eco-
nomic use. That this standard tends to protect historic preservation
is hardly surprising, since it was fashioned in a historic preservation
dispute. But it is useful to specify the ways it is helpful.
Landmark protection, particularly in urban cores, will tend to de-
press the value of a property, at least in the short term, whenever it
prohibits a full build-out to the zoning envelope. As in Penn Cen-
tral, this loss can be large, whether measured in dollars or lost FAR.
While Penn Central's inquiry is articulated broadly in terms of
"economic impact," the Court actually looks only to the constitu-
tional sufficiency of what the owner continues to retain. Only the
solvency of the investment in the retained rights, and not the
magnitude of precluded opportunity, provides a measure of loss.
Moreover, the Court makes clear that it weighs the potential value of
the retained rights, not their current or short-term net income posi-
tion. This last point is particularly significant for landmarks, be-
cause it channels thinking toward creative reuse of the building.
Historic preservation regulations typically do not restrict the uses
to which an owner can put her property; rather, they primarily pro-
tect original exterior architectural features. Developers have shown
themselves increasingly imaginative in fashioning new and profit-
able uses for historic buildings. Architects have developed convinc-
ing approaches to incorporating historic fabric into significant ex-
pansions of landmark sites that qualitatively improve on Breuer's
justly ridiculed "aesthetic joke." 17 In these circumstances, it is rare
17. See generally Paul Byard, THE ARCHITECTURE OF ADDITIONS
(1998). A favorite example of mine is the former Masonic Temple
in Washington, which now houses the Gallup Organization, in which
a modem tower is joined to an authentically restored three story
building by a playful atrium. Historic Masonic Temple Rehabilita-
tion in Washington, DC Wins Two Prestigious Industry Awards, at
http://www.karchem.com/sections/company/news-awdl.html (last
viewed May 1, 2004). The previous owner claimed for years that the
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that a historic property will be divested of all economic value or that
a developer will be denied the possibility of a reasonable return.18
Other cases amplify the nature of the economic showing that the
owner must make. A property owner will not be able to prove a
regulatory taking if he cannot show that the sale of the property was
impracticable, that commercial rental could not provide a reasonable
rate of return, or that other potential use of the property was fore-
closed. 19 It will be difficult for a property owner to show that a his-
toric building has no reasonable economic use, since an historic
preservation ordinance does not foreclose any use of the historic
property. For example, in the District of Columbia a claim brought
by the owner of a designated landmark failed where evidence existed
that the property could have been rented "as is," with minimal reno-
vation, or with full renovations, which were possible at a lower cost
than claimed by the petitioner.20 In any such case the burden of
proof will be on the owner plaintiff.
That the standards for economic hardship have grown more severe
over time is illustrated by comparing another pair of cases from the
District of Columbia. In the first significant court interpretation of
the DCHPA, the Court of Appeals upheld the determination of the
"Mayor's Agent," an administrative law judge who determines
whether demolition of a landmark is permissible as a "project of
special merit," and found that the fabled Rhodes Tavern could be
demolished to build a first class office building across from the
Treasury.2 1 One factor identified by the Mayor's Agent and relied
on by the court was the cost to the developer of retaining Rhodes
Tavern in the new project. The Court plainly worried that requiring
building could not be renovated on an economic basis. See 900 G St.
Assoc. v. DHCD, 430 A.2d 1387, 1392 (D.C. 1981).
18. Historic preservation could generate more takings if there was
an aggressive program to preserve through regulation cultural land-
scape, such as meadows or pastures produced through traditional
farming techniques. New York City's preservation law permits des-
ignation of landscape features only when found on city-owned prop-
erty.
19. Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1066 (5th Cir.
1975).
20. 900 G St. Assoc., 430 A.2d at 1392.
21. Citizens Comm. to Save Historic Rhodes Tavern v. D.C.
Dep't of Hous. & Comm. Dev., 432 A.2d 710 (1981).
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an owner to bear substantial costs to preserve an historic structure
was illegitimate.22 By contrast, in a more recent case, the court re-
versed the Mayor's Agent for relying on cost as a factor in permit-
ting demolition without finding that it met the statutory standard for
23economic hardship. The cost to the developer was essentially
brushed aside with the observation that "[w]here the economic bur-
den of maintaining and preserving a historic building is onerous, the
Preservation Act provides an owner with the opportunity to seek
demolition on the separate ground of 'unreasonable economic hard-
ship.'''24  The legal development charted here reflects a greater
acceptance of the notion that owners should bear the costs of preser-
22. Consequently, it was entirely proper for the Mayor's Agent to
consider evidence offered by interveners showing that preservation
of all three structures would cost upward of $7.2 million. Absent
public funding, it is apparent that petitioner expects interveners to
bear this cost alone and that, if they do, demolition of Rhodes Tavern
will not be necessary. However, as one court has stated: 'It is laud-
able to attempt to preserve a landmark; however, it becomes uncon-
scionable when an unwilling private party is required to bear the ex-
pense.'... Requiring private parties to spend substantial sums of
money to preserve landmark structures-with little or no public as-
sistance-could rise to the level of an unconstitutional taking.
Moreover, development-so vital to a city's growth-could be sty-
mied irreparably. By placing the costs of architectural preservation
squarely on the landmark owner, design and demolition controls may
actually discourage private citizens from purchasing and maintaining
landmark property. Failure to offset the economic burdens of land-
mark designation will 'create a class of buildings which will be
shunned like lepers.'
Id. at 716. (citations omitted).
23. Comm. of 100 on the Fed. City v. D.C. DCRA, 571 A.2d 195
(1990). The court stated, "[t]he issue is not whether a Class "B"
building can command the level of rents necessary to justify the ex-
pense of renovation, but whether demolition of the Woodward
Building and the historic values statutorily ascribed to buildings lo-
cated within historic districts is justified by the cost of renovation
and by the benefits which the new building would bring to the com-
munity." Id. at 203.
24. Id. at 202.
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vation, so long as their investment retains a reasonable prospect of
profit.
There are a number of reasons why courts and administrators are
becoming more comfortable with developers bearing the costs of
historic preservation. The scope of the police power and consequent
justification for limiting an owner's property rights have always de-
pended on social norms, so that new grounds for restriction raise
much greater resistance than familiar ones. Euclid itself emphasized
that restrictions that may have been objectionable to earlier genera-
tions now seem perfectly appropriate. 2 5 As noted above, aesthetic
goals have become an acceptable goal for land development regula-
tion. So, too, historic preservation has become a "normal" feature of
urban land regulation, and the real estate market has adjusted to the
costs and opportunities that preservation provides. Penn Central
was the indispensable step in creating the safe harbor within which
historic protection could become "normal."
At the same time, there are at least two other legal developments
that have inured decision-makers to the complaints of landmark
owners. First, tax credits. Beginning with the Tax Reform Act of
1976, the federal government has provided a credit for the costs of
rehabilitation and favorable terms for depreciation of the costs of
rehabilitation. 26 This provides "compensation," in the very broadest
25. In its landmark decision upholding comprehensive zoning, the
Court stated:
Until recent years, urban life was comparatively simple;
but with the great increase and concentration of popula-
tion, problems have developed, and constantly are devel-
oping, which require, and will continue to require, addi-
tional restrictions in respect of the use and occupation of
private lands in urban communities. Regulations the
wisdom, necessity and validity of which, as applied to ex-
isting conditions, are so apparent that they are now uni-
formly sustained, a century ago, or even a half century-
ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and
oppressive.
Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386 (1926).
26. Garvin, p. 491. Chicago Landmarks lists the range of current
federal and state tax incentives on its website, CityofChicago.com, at
www.cityofchicago.org/landmarks/Preservation.html (last viewed
May 1, 2004).
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sense, as well as important incentives, for developers taking on the
burdens of rehabilitation. Second, the practice of local governments
of requiring developers to pay for infrastructure and amenities in the
land development process became ubiquitous and its constitutional-
ity, within broad restraints, is now settled.27 The pervasiveness of
such exactions normalized the notion that development required
some kind of bargain between the developer and the regulatory au-
thority, wherein the developer should compensate the public for the
costs broadly attributable to new development. When developers
must provide the wherewithal for new parks, schools, or affordable
housing on the urban perimeter, it seems less onerous to require
them to bear the costs of preserving historic fabric within the center.
In considering the elements that have insulated historic protections
from successful takings claims, one device notable for its absence is
transferable development rights. Penn Central's ability to transfer
its unused development air rights to neighboring properties undoubt-
edly was an important factor in the Court's conclusion that New
York's rejection of the addition did not work a taking. Indeed, a
major point of disagreement between the majority and Justice
Rehnquist in dissent concerned whether TDR's should be seen as
retained value in deciding whether a taking had occurred or only as
compensation for a taking, a disagreement that has reverberated in
subsequent decisions. In any case, TDR's have not proven indispen-
sable, or even common, in practice. TDR's have been used some-
what to mitigate losses to owners caused by severe development re-
strictions imposed on environmentally sensitive lands, such as at
Lake Tahoe in Nevada and in the Pinelands of New Jersey. But
there is little evidence of widespread use of TDR's to support his-
toric landmark protections outside New York City.28
The difficulty for an owner seeking to prevail in an historic preser-
vation takings case is illustrated by the interesting case of District
Intown Properties v. District of Columbia.29 Plaintiff owned a
27. See generally Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 825 (1994);
Ehrlich v. City of Culver, 911 P.2d 429 (1996).
28. TDR's were important in the effort to preserve historic thea-
ters in New York and helped protect theater land marking against a
takings challenge. See Shubert Org. v. Landmarks Pres. Comm'n,
570 N.Y.S.2d 504, 507 (1991).
29. Dist. Intown Props. v. District of Columbia 198 F.3d 874
(D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 812 (2000).
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prominent apartment building, Cathedral Mansions, and wished to
build town houses on the extensive lawns between the building and
Connecticut Avenue. If it had simply sought a permit and been de-
nied, a subsequent takings claim would easily have been defeated,
because the property as a whole retained very substantial value.
However, the plaintiff subdivided the property into nine contiguous
lots before the city designated the entire property an historic land-
mark. When the owner sought permits to build on eight of the lots
and was denied, it claimed that the application of the regulations
denied him all the economic value of those lots in violation of Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Commission.30 Owners of historic proper-
ties rarely have plausible Lucas claims because preservation ordi-
nances do not forbid all uses of a property, as compared with envi-
ronmental regulations of the type involved in Lucas, which forbade
any permanent structures on vacant lots. Even a historic battlefield
can be farmed, although in practice such sites are likely to be pur-
chased to permit public access. The owner in District Intown clev-
erly tried to create a Lucas case by breaking off the historic lawns
from the apartments, and formally placing them in separate lots,
which the Board would not allow to be developed. Thus, after des-
ignation there would be parcels of which no economic use could be
made. The owner failed, however, when the court concluded that the
relevant parcel for takings analysis was the entire original complex,
given how long it had held them as one and the notice of new regula-
tion at the time of the subdivision.3 1 Owners of historic properties
rarely will own buildings of which no economic use can be made.
This difficulty can be understood more fully in considering the two
reported cases in which owners prevailed in regulatory takings
claims against application of historic preservation restrictions.
Keeler v. Mayor & City Council of Cumberland32 involved that
city's rejection of a petition by a Roman Catholic church to demolish
a historic monastery. The takings finding stood on the fact that the
City had stipulated that no economically feasible plan could be for-
mulated for the preservation of the Church buildings. 33 This proba-
30. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
31. Dist. Intown Props., 198 F.3d at 880-82.
32. 940 F. Supp. 879 (D.Md. 1996).
33. Id. at 888. The decision may have been influenced by the ad-
ditional holding that application of the ordinance violated the
church's right to the free exercise of religion. Id. at 886-87.
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bly was not true in fact, since the church could have sold the monas-
tery, which might have been converted to a hotel or other use. But,
in any event, the ill-advised concession by the city led the Court to
conclude that Lucas applied.
The difficult case is one in which the historical building is so dere-
lict that the cost of renovation for safe use exceeds its market poten-
tial. The owner in Broadview Apartments Co. v. Commission for
Historical and Architectural Preservation 34 prevailed on such a tak-
ings claim, when the City of Baltimore did a poor job of contesting
the owner's experts' cost and value estimates. Certainly, there may
be instances where buildings in undesirable locations cannot gener-
ate a rental income that can justify historic renovation, but that lack
of demand often will mean that no one wants to do anything at all
with the site, which can "mothball" a building. But owners will find
it difficult to win such cases; they never would amount to a per se
taking as in Lucas, but would require detailed economic analysis of
costs and benefits in a particular factual context. The overwhelming
fact is that there is no other reported decision in which a local pres-
ervation agency seriously contested the economic viability of restor-
ing a building and lost a subsequent takings claim. Historic preser-
vation staff and lawyers have learned a great deal in the twenty plus
years since Broadview Apartments. There are many devices for pre-
venting such a conclusion, such as bundling the derelict house with
new compatible structures on the same site, so that revenue from the
new buildings will support renovation of the old.35
Finally, Penn Central also brought to frustration of distinct in-
vestment backed expectations to the center of attention for economic
analysis. The useful and familiar argument here is that the owner
bought the designated property subject to historic controls and could
have no reasonable expectation that he could build in disregard of
34. 433 A.2d 1214 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981).
35. This was done to save a magnificent but decrepit townhouse,
known as the Louise, that had stood vacant on 7th St. NE, in Wash-
ington, D.C., for many years. The developer included restoration of
the building as part of a project that included 17 new townhouses, in
part to secure neighborhood good will. After the fact, the developer
indicated that the restoration had paid for itself and increased the
sales value of the entire project. CAPITOL HILL RESTORATION SOC'Y,
NOMINATION OF HOLLADAY CORPORATION FOR A MAYOR'S AWARD
FOR EXCELLENCE IN HISTORIC PRESERVATION (2003).
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them; indeed the price paid should have reflected limits on that use.
36
After Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,37 it is clear that becoming an owner
after an ordinance goes into effect will not defeat a takings claim per
se, but it is highly likely that it will defeat nearly all such claim in
which the current owner bought in a normal market transaction after
designation. A good example is Weinberg v. City of Pittsburgh.38
There, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld a finding of no
unreasonable hardship, in part because the owner had bought the
designated landmark with full knowledge of existing historical con-
trols. The court reversed the contrary finding by the Commonwealth
Court, which had held that the purchaser had reasonably underesti-
mated the cost of renovation. But the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
placed the burden of that mistake squarely on the shoulders of the
purchaser: "The fact that they did not engage the services of an ar-
chitect or contractor to estimate the cost or feasibility of restoring the
Gateway House cannot serve as a basis for their claims of economic
hardship after the fact."
39
On the other hand, purchase before designation may still not give
rise to reasonable expectations of development to the limits of exist-
ing zoning when the probability of designation is or should be
known. In District Intown, the owner subdivided the lawn lots in
1979 and sought permits to construct the new buildings before the
property was designated a landmark. The court found, however,
after 1979, D.C.'s historic landmark laws additionally
limited expectations of development. Thus, at the time
District Intown subdivided the property, it knew, or
should have known, that the property was potentially sub-
ject to regulation under the landmark laws... Businesses
that operate in an industry with a history of regulation
have no reasonable expectation that regulation will not be
strengthened to achieve established legislative ends. See
Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Construction Laborers Pen-
sion Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993). In this case, Dis-
trict Intown was in the real estate business, with a history
of restriction of development for the purpose of preserv-
36. E.g., 900 G St. Assoc. v. DHCD, 430 A.2d 1387, 1390 (D.C.
1981).
37. 533 U. S. 608 (2001).
38. 676 A.2d. 207 (1996).
39. Id. at 213.
2004]
328 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
ing historic sites....Prior to and after subdivision, this
particular property was the subject of increasing public
activity devoted to restricting development through land-
mark designation.4 °
Historic preservation laws actually shape the reasonable expecta-
tions of owners of undesignated properties more definitely than do
the laws considered in the precedents relied on by the District In-
town court. In the latter instances, owners found their property regu-
lated to a comparatively mild degree when they made investments,
but the regulations were strengthened by subsequent generally appli-
cable legislative amendments. For example, the owner in Good v.
United States4' bought his property at a time when he could fill his
wetlands for development with only minor regulatory hurdles, but
held it while Congress and agencies made it much more difficult to
obtain a permit to do so; the court held that he could not claim unfair
surprise because he had "watch[ed] as the applicable regulations got
more stringent, before taking any steps to obtain the required ap-
proval. ' 42 In a historic preservation case like District Intown, the
regulatory structure already was in place when the subdivision was
made; what had not yet occurred was the landmark designation of
the particular property. No owner of a property eligible for designa-
tion under an existing preservation ordinance should be seen to have
a reasonable expectation to develop free of historic protections. The
criteria for and practice of past designations should make it clear
whether a petition to designate will succeed.43
-Moreover, there are specific features of historic preservation law
that must shape an owner's reasonable expectations before designa-
tion. The National Historic Preservation Act extends its protective
consideration of the impact of federal "undertakings" over all prop-
erties eligible for inclusion in the National Register of Historic
40. Dist. Intown Props. v. District of Columbia 198 F.3d 874
(D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 812, 833-34 (2000).
41. 189 F.3d 1355, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
42. Id. at 1362.
43. The District Intown court, for example, noted that "almost the
entire length of Connecticut Avenue from M Street to almost a mile
north of District Intown's property is either land marked or within a
historic district." 198 F.3d at 884. Expectations would be different,
of course, in a benighted jurisdiction that requires the consent of the
owner for designation.
[VOL. XV
HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAWS
Places, whether or not they have been actually designated for inclu-
sion. 44 Also, local ordinances often provide that the filing of a peti-
tion for designation stays issuance of a demolition permit to allow
the petition to be weighed on the merits,45 thus continuing the public
policy of protecting even undesignated properties by historic preser-
vation laws. Now that every state and nearly every locality has such
laws on their books, developers must adjust to the regulatory envi-
ronment. In some fundamental way the property baseline has
moved.
There is an additional argument about the reasonable expectations
of the owner of a historic property that complements the point that
owners should anticipate now-ubiquitous preservation restrictions.
Historical structures embody settled expectations. By definition al-
most, historic properties are those constructed and long used for par-
ticular purposes that more or less fulfilled the original expectations
of their creators. When the original owner continues in ownership of
the property, as Penn Central did Grand Central Station, a court is
likely to conclude, as the Penn Central Court did, that the restriction
precluding new construction "does not interfere with what must be
regarded as [the owner's] primary expectation regarding the use of
the parcel."46 The historic structure and use determine the "primary
expectation" for the original owner, and new expectations face the
hurdle of identifying some new significant investment at a point in
time later than the original acquisition. This is an even more serious
hurdle for enduring non-profit organizations, such as churches and
endowed schools. Not only will such an organization often be an
original owner who has long persisted in a particular use, but also
the test of economic harm such owner must meet is whether the re-
striction prevents the organization from carrying out that purpose in
its current facilities.47 District Intown indicates that not only original
44. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470, 470f (2000).
45. See, e.g., D.C. Code, § 6-1102(6).
46. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136
(1978) (emphasis added).
47. See Rector of St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York,
914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991);
Soc'y for Ethical Culture v. Spatt, 415 N.E. 2d 922, 936 (N.Y. 1980)
("There is no genuine complaint that eleemosynary activities within
the landmark are wrongfully disrupted, but rather the complaint is
instead that the landmark stands as an effective bar against putting
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owners but also purchasers who persist in the original uses face the
hurdle of a court concluding that a new development is not a signifi-
48cant part of their investment backed expectations.
IV. INCENTIVE FOR ACCOMMODATION
Penn Central did not leave the property owner defenseless. The
fact that there are very few reported cases in which property owners
have prevailed in regulatory takings claims against historic protec-
tions does not mean that the constitutional provision plays no role.
The threat of liability to municipalities plays a much larger role in
the land use regulation process than do any actual recoveries. 49 The
property owner can argue that some regulation goes too far, and the
regulator often will find it difficult to dismiss the likelihood of liabil-
ity given the vague and sometimes contradictory factors at play.
Thus, the regulator nearly always has some incentive to find a com-
promise that preserves the essentials of a historic resource while
permitting adaptation for a remunerative use.
As noted above, historic preservation law is well suited for this
kind of negotiated regulation. First, it does not in principle restrict
the uses to which a property may be put, but only restricts demoli-
the property to its most lucrative use."). See also Cindy Moy, Re-
formulating the New York City Landmarks Preservation Law's Fi-
nancial Hardship Provision: Preserving the Big Apple, 14 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L. J. 447 (1996).
48. "Here, as in Penn Central, the regulation does not interfere
with District Intown's "primary expectation" concerning the use of
the parcel, because it "not only permits but contemplates that appel-
lants may continue to use the property precisely as it has been used"
for the past 28 years." Dist. Intown Props., 198 F.3d at 136.
49. Justice Stevens captured the dilemma in noting how allowing
damages actions for overreaching land use regulations can over deter
appropriate regulation: "Cautious local officials and land-use plan-
ners may avoid taking any action that might later be challenged and
thus give rise to a damages action. Much important regulation will
never be enacted, even perhaps in the health and safety area." First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 340-41 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted).
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tion or alteration of existing designated properties, usually only on
the exterior. Indeed, preservationists often seek a relaxation of zon-
ing rules to permit reuse of buildings to serve current market de-
mand. A classic example of this phenomenon is New York City's
rezoning of cast iron lofts in SOHO for residential purposes in the
1970's. Secondly, even in preserving exterior fabric, some change
is often permissible, as the legal standards for alterations or addi-
tional construction are based on notions of "appropriateness" or
"compatibility." Since the era of Breuer, architects have progressed
impressively in creating imaginative and contextual designs for addi-
tions to landmarks or for new construction in historic districts. 5' Fi-
nally, historic preservation does not require in principle a single-
minded devotion to total domination of land development decisions
by preservation values. While there certainly are cases where any
significant alterations simply are unacceptable because they seri-
ously diminish an important landmark, there are many more cases
where some less critical historic fabric can be sacrificed to achieve
broader development goals, or simply to cut a workable deal.52 One
50. See Garvin, supra note 26, at 489-90.
51. Permission for additions may sometimes go beyond compati-
bility. The D.C. Historic Preservation Act permits demolition of a
landmark to permit construction of a "project of special merit," D.C.
Code, § 6-1104(e), based on its "exemplary architecture," D.C.
Code, § 6-1102(10). The D.C. Mayor's Agent recently approved
under this provision demolition of a portion of the landmark Cor-
coran Gallery to permit construction of a new addition in flamboyant
design by Frank Geary. In re Corcoran Gallery of Art, HPA 02-284
(Sept. 19, 2002), available at http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/histpres/
decisions/hpa02-284summ.html
52. An interesting example of this in the District is the final ap-
proval of an office tower at 10th and F Streets, NW, adjacent to the
landmark St. Patrick's Catholic Church. After an initial proposal to
demolish seven nineteenth century stores, except for their facades on
F Street was rejected by the Historic Preservation Review Board and
the Mayor's Agent, In re Archdiocese of Washington, HPA 99-219,
et al (Nov. 9, 1999), available at http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/
histpres/decisions/results.cfm, the Planning Office initiated a media-
tion process that resulted in approval of a new plan as a project of
special merit that preserved four of the stores to a depth of 50 feet,
along with the facades of two others and removed the mass of the
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must rely on a flexible process involving expert consideration and
meaningful public comment to sort out these instances.
53
The rights of the property owners typically are incorporated into
the historic preservation ordinance itself. Many contain an excep-
tions clause that prohibits enforcement of preservation mandates
when doing so would impose severe economic hardship on the
owner. New York City provides that an owner may be able to obtain
a certificate of appropriateness for demolition or new construction
on the ground of "insufficient return," which for a non-tax-exempt
property is set legislatively at 6%. Such provisions provide that
designated properties that cannot be economically used may be de-
molished, and create another check on the power of historic preser-
vation agencies.
Some jurisdictions make this exception coterminous with the stan-
dard for a regulatory taking.55 In D.C., the statute itself provides
that: "'[u]nreasonable economic hardship' means that the failure to
issue a permit would amount to a taking of the owner's property
without just compensation." 56 This statute was drafted primarily by
David Bonderman, who wrote an important brief for the National
Trust and several cities in support of New York in Penn Central.
57
office building to the comer of the block. In the Matter of the John
Akridge Co, and the Archdiocese of Washington, HPA Nos. 01, 219,
et al (August 1, 2001) (available at www.ll.georgetwon.edu/histpres/
decisions/hpa01-219-224,208209.htm). While some historic stores
will be demolished, they individually lack great significance. The
regulators were able to preserve a last row of low-rise storefronts in
downtown Washington, a notable preservation victory.
53. Carol Rose long ago recognized that historic preservation in
an urban context involves a process of community self-definition in
which public participation and fair procedures may be more impor-
tant than substantive criteria. Carol M. Rose, Preservation and
Community: New Directions in the Law Of Historic Preservation, 33
STAN. L. REv. 473 (1981).
54. N.Y.C. Admin. Code 25-302(v).
55. E.g., Illinois Coll. of Surgeons v. City of Chicago, 153 F.3d
356, 368 (7th Cir. 1998); United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v.
Philadelphia, 635 A.2d 612, 618 n.3 (Pa. 1993).
56. D.C. Code § 6-1102 (14).
57. See Jeremy Dutra, "You Can't Tear It Down:" the Origins of
the D.C. Historic Preservation Act, 23-24 (2002), available at www.
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Such an exceptions clause has two effects. First, it permits the
owner to demolish a building in the unusual circumstances where
there is no alternative use, thereby avoiding constitutional litigation.
Officials should be able to assess the owner's case and adjust their
requirements to permit adequate return for the owner on his invest-
ment. Second, it locates disputes about economic impact within the
permitting process, giving initial control over fact-finding about
economic harms and alternatives to the local preservation board.
Under the Supreme Court's Williamson County doctrine, no private
litigant would be allowed to pursue a takings claim in court without
seeking relief under such a statutory hardship route. 58  Such a
scheme usually creates a steeper hill for the takings claimant to
mount. In the District of Columbia, no litigant has ever prevailed on
a claim of economic hardship.59
Given this legal terrain, developers interested in developing land-
marks have an incentive to propose developments that have some
chance of approval. Bucking the system is costly and unlikely to
prove rewarding. Regulators in turn have an incentive to approve
responsible proposals, because doing so enhances the political ac-
ceptability of preservation review, eases opposition to expansion of
the system from additional designations, and allows the municipality
to avoid costly and embarrassing takings losses. Since the focus
turns to the economic potential of the site under various proposals,
llgeorgetown.edu/histpres/papers/papers-dutra.pdf (last viewed May
1, 2004).
58. Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton
Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
59. In 900 G St. Assoc., the court stated that "[pletitioner had the
burden of proof in the hearing to establish that no other reasonable
economic use for the Building existed. Since the Act assigned the
function of taking evidence and making determinations to the
Mayor's Agent and she heard the testimony in the instant case and
possessed the administrative expertise, the decision of the Mayor's
Agent will be upheld by this court in resolving questions of fact
unless it appears from the record that there is obvious and egregious
error." 900 G St. Assoc., 430 A.2d at 1392. New York City Land-
mark's Preservation Commission's procedures for owners who want
to demolish or alter their landmarks has been criticized as burden-
some to owners and biased toward the Commission. Id. at 390; see
also Moy; supra note 47, at 486.
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both developers and regulators have a self-interest in finding a com-
promise that retains the visual integrity of the landmark and permits
useful adaptation. Penn Central seems to have placed us in a prag-
matic workable constitutional context for landmark preservation.
V. CONCLUSION
Penn Central nearly always protects historic preservation deci-
sions from takings challenges. Developers rarely bother to contest
the constitutionality of preservation restraints, but seek to craft pro-
posals that will be approved. This is not that hard, given some archi-
tectural and entrepreneurial imagination. Historic preservation laws
do not forbid any uses and most historic buildings can be put to
some valuable use. Historic preservation law has matured under
these conditions to provide significant control over design and scale
for much urban development.
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